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ABSTRACT: The recent drastic development of agriculture, together with the growing 
societal interest in agricultural practices and their consequences, pose a challenge to 
agricultural science. There is a need for rethinking the general methodology of 
agricultural research. This paper takes some steps towards developing a systemic 
research methodology that can meet this challenge – a general self-reflexive 
methodology that forms a basis for doing holistic or (with a better term) wholeness-
oriented research and provides appropriate criteria of scientific quality.  
From a philosophy of research perspective, science is seen as an interactive 
learning process with both a cognitive and a social communicative aspect. This means, 
first of all, that science plays a role in the world that it studies. A science that influences 
its own subject area, such as agricultural science, is named a systemic science. From this 
perspective, there is a need to reconsider the role of values in science. Science is not 
objective in the sense of being value-free. Values play, and ought to play, an important 
role in science – not only in form of constitutive values such as the norms of good 
science, but also in the form of contextual values that enter into the very process of 
science. This goes against the traditional criterion of objectivity. Therefore, reflexive 
objectivity is suggested as a new criterion for doing good science, along with the 
criterion of relevance. Reflexive objectivity implies that the communication of science 
must include the cognitive context, which comprises the societal, intentional, and 
observational context. In accordance with this, the learning process of systemic research 
is shown as a self-reflexive cycle that incorporates both an involved actor stance and a 
detached observer stance. The observer stance forms the basis for scientific 
communication.  
To this point, a unitary view of science as a learning process is employed. A second 
important perspective for a systemic research methodology is the relation between the 
actual, different, and often quite separate kinds of science. Cross-disciplinary research is 
hampered by the idea that reductive science is more objective, and hence more 
scientific, than the less reductive sciences of complex subject areas – and by the 
opposite idea that reductive science is necessarily reductionistic. Taking reflexive 
objectivity as a demarcator of good science, an inclusive framework of science can be 
established. The framework does not take the established division between natural, 
social and human science as a primary distinction of science. The major distinction is 
made between the empirical and normative aspects of science, corresponding to two key 
cognitive interests. Two general methodological dimensions, the degree of reduction of 
the research world and the degree of involvement in the research world, are shown to 
span this framework. The framework can form a basis for transdisciplinary work by way 
of showing the relation between more and less reductive kinds of science and between 
more detached and more involved kinds of science and exposing the abilities and 
limitations attendant on these methodological differences. 
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2 
Introduction 
 
Agriculture has developed rapidly in the last half century, and today agriculture — and 
agricultural research — is faced with problems concerning nature and environment, 
human health, and animal welfare, as well as a general concern for the sustainability of 
modern agriculture. Two major trends can be discerned: a continuing technological and 
structural development, which is the cause of a substantial rise in productivity as well as 
a (partial) cause of the problems, and the rise of counter movements towards a more 
natural, sustainable, and locally based agriculture.  
 
This paper has a practical background in agricultural systems research and research in 
organic farming. Agriculture is characterized by an agricultural practice that involves 
both social and ecological systems. Research into these socio-ecological systems faces 
the dual challenge of understanding complex agro-ecosystem interactions and the 
practices of human actors in social systems. Agricultural systems research is therefore 
inherently framed in a social context, and necessarily involves questions concerning 
different interests and values in society as well as different structures of rationality and 
meaning (Kristensen and Halberg, 1997). Organic farming in particular has 
differentiated itself from conventional agriculture by way of an alternative agricultural 
practice, which has developed as part of a wider organic movement incorporating 
producers, manufacturers, and consumers. The organic movement has formulated a set 
of basic principles and standards that are based on a perception of humans and human 
society as an integrated part of nature and a conception of health as part of a continuum 
through soil, plant, animal, and man (Woodward et al., 1996).  
 
In this paper, we address the challenges to agricultural research entailed by the general 
agricultural development and the intricate relations between agricultural practices and 
values in society. According to Lockeretz and Anderson (1993), there is a need for 
rethinking the approaches, processes, and institutional structures of agricultural 
research, because of the range and scale of consequences that agricultural research is 
expected to address today. There are high political demands on the relevance and 
proactive perspective of research in relation to the changing goals, intentions, and 
values of society and agriculture. These demands are not restricted to agricultural 
research. They are part of a more general change in the conception of science1 and its 
role in society, from that of an independent science as a source of objective knowledge 
to that of science as a special learning process for society. The agricultural background 
of this paper does, however, provide a particular perspective on science, because 
agricultural science obviously is what we call a “systemic” science.  
 
A systemic science is a science that influences its own subject area. Agriculture is an 
area in rapid development — both in terms of technological development and in terms 
of the development of alternative production systems. And agricultural research plays 
an influential role in these developments. Hence, agricultural science influences its own 
subject area, agriculture, in important ways. Other sciences that are clearly systemic are 
                                                 
1 In this paper the term 'science' is used in a broader sense than common in English, in line with the 
German "Wissenschaft", as a generic term that includes social and human sciences (or cultural sciences) 
as well as natural science.  
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for instance health science and environmental science; engineering and technological 
sciences such as biotechnology and information technology; and economical, political, 
and social sciences. And even some of the physical sciences such as condensed matter 
physics.2 
 
The sciences of science (philosophy of science, social studies of science, etc.) are also 
systemic. In accordance with this insight, we do not aim at an observational, 
sociological description of research in agricultural systems in this paper. We take a 
wider philosophical and systemic perspective that aims also at contributing to the 
development of agricultural science. Social studies of science have revealed that science 
is in many ways similar to other social systems where power and interests play an 
influential role. This has led to suggestions that scientific knowledge is socially 
constructed.3 Recognizing science as a social system does not, however, in itself 
question objectivity and truth as general regulative ideals, despite the actual 
shortcomings of science in this respect. But when science plays a role in the world that 
it studies, the criteria of objectivity becomes problematic as a general scientific ideal.4 
 
Due to this, there is a need for rethinking the role of values in agricultural research. 
Both in terms of where and how values enter into the research process (contextual 
values), and in terms of how the systemic nature of agricultural research relates to the 
conventional scientific criteria of quality (constitutive values).5 This need applies 
generally to agricultural research. But the role of values is particularly evident with 
regard to organic farming, because special values and goals play an obvious and 
decisive role here, and because these values are clearly different from the values of 
mainstream agriculture. For a long while, agricultural science and industry have, in near 
unison, employed a common set of values connected to production size and, later, 
productivity, as overall goals. These goals have mainly been implicit and tacitly 
understood because of a lack of disagreement about them. In the last decades, however, 
                                                 
2 Generally, all the so-called human, social and cultural sciences are systemic, because persons and social 
systems have some ability to react to what science says. And furthermore all technological or 
'developmental' sciences are systemic, because they influence the evolutionary course of the world. One 
might object, as an anonymous reviewer did, that the term 'systemic science' seems to be too general to be 
of much use. Indeed, taken as a whole, science must be characterised as systemic – science influences the 
world that it studies. But, firstly, there are special sciences that are destined (cosmology and pure 
historical sciences) or determined (classical observational sciences) not to influence their subject area. 
And secondly, the concept is intended more as an eye opener than as a practical way of categorising 
sciences. When taking this perspective and recognising some science as systemic, one is led to reflect 
upon the interactions between science and the world. Sciences that are recognised as systemic from 
without are not necessarily self-reflexively aware of their systemic nature. But describing them as 
systemic may lead to such reflection. In the following, the terms 'systemic science' and 'systemic research' 
will mainly be designating science that has some insight in its own systemic character. These terms differ 
from 'applied science' in that they do not share the conception of a clear separation and linear relation 
between basic and applied sciences (see further below). 
3 For a good and balanced discussion of social constructionism in science, see Ian Hacking (1999).  
4 To the surprise of some, perhaps, Karl Popper recognised that social science cannot be objective due to 
the influence of social science on society - and that this interaction between the observed object and the 
observing subject is not limited to social science, but also found in biology, psychology, and, even, 
physics (Popper, 1957: chapter 6 and 32).  
5 The distinction between constitutive values, which constitute the norms of good science, and contextual 
values, which are the personal, social and cultural values that may influence science, is due to Helen 
Longino (1990: 4ff).  
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the values of alternative agriculture have been brought forward, exposing and opposing 
the tacit conventional values. This opposition is a development that is connected to 
more general changes in environmental concerns (Stern et al., 1995). 
 
Therefore, the need to investigate and develop the methodology of “holistic” or 
systemic research has been particularly evident in research in organic farming (e.g., 
Krell, 1997: 5; Zanoli and Krell, 1999). But the general picture, according to William 
Lockeretz (2000), is that organic research at present is hardly different from 
conventional research with respect to actually using holistic or even system-oriented 
methods. One reason for this can be that the holistic approaches are generally perceived 
as less scientific than conventional, analytical approaches. Perhaps this is so because 
there is no well-founded general systemic research methodology that incorporates both 
system-oriented and analytic research, with appropriate and clear criteria for how to do 
good systemic science.  
 
Different meanings can be attached to the concepts of “systems” and “systems 
research.” The kind of systems theory that underlies the present paper has its roots in the 
theory of living systems as autopoietic (Maturana and Varela, 1980; 1987), second order 
cybernetics (Foerster, 1984) and the communicative theory of social systems (Luhmann, 
1995). As a systems methodology, it is related to critical systems thinking (Ulrich, 
1994; Ulrich, 1990) and to the soft systems approaches (Checkland, 1981; Bawden, 
1992). 
 
The primary aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of a systemic research 
methodology in agriculture and similar sciences. This includes determining appropriate 
criteria of scientific quality for systemic research, with special regard to the role of 
values in science. We take two approaches towards this goal. The first approach is to 
investigate science as a learning process in order to see how intentions enter into 
cognition in general, how analogies can be drawn to science, and in which respects 
science is special. It is also to see what the consequences are for (especially) the 
criterion of objectivity. The second approach is to investigate the distinctions between 
different kinds of science that are actually used, and to analyze the distinctions that need 
to be made, seen from our perspective on science. This approach is to provide a more 
adequate framework for doing transdisciplinary research. In the present paper, we do 
not intend to actually show what the values in agricultural research are or precisely how 
the suggested methodology is to be applied to agriculture. We merely want to show how 
one should think about the claim that there are such values in research. But we do intend 
to follow this paper with a paper on the implications of the systemic research 
methodology that will show the relevance to agricultural research in more detail. 
 
Space does not allow for detailed examples of how values enter into agricultural 
research in this paper. But one aspect of this has already been the subject of some 
attention, namely the exposure of values embedded in scientific concepts. Several 
papers have discussed the different meanings of important evaluative or normative 
concepts in agricultural research and what values these meanings imply, as well as the 
ethical basis for the normative concepts. For example concerning sustainability (e.g., 
Douglass, 1984; Thompson, 1996; 1997) and precaution (e.g. O'Riordan and Cameron, 
1994; Gremmen and Belt, 2000; Alrøe and Kristensen, 2001), nature conservation 
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(Callicott et al., 1999) and nature quality (Alrøe and Kristensen, 2000), animal welfare 
(e.g. Tannenbaum, 1991; Rollin, 1996; Sandøe et al., 1996; Fraser, 1999; Alrøe et al., 
2001), and soil fertility (Patzel et al., 2000).  
 
 
Science as a learning process 
 
Prior to the question of whether holistic or systemic research in agriculture can be 
scientific, and prior to the determination of criteria for good systemic science, lies the 
question of what science is. Answering this question also, in turn, comprises an answer 
to the question of “demarcation” as the defining distinction between science and non 
science6.  
 
A conventional conception of science is that science is an independent, detached, and 
objective observer of the world. This conception of science can be, and has been, 
criticized through sociological studies of how science is actually performed, of the 
impacts of interests and power structures, and of the role of science in society. 
However, such sociological studies have no critical force in relation to the ideal of an 
objective science. One could argue that science can be objective if it is done in the right 
way. And there is some force in the argument that the critical method of science 
eventually will overcome the actual biases – in the final opinion. But the conventional 
conception of science can also be the subject of a more involved, philosophical 
investigation that provides a normative critique of scientific inquiry. 
 
We suggest that answers to the questions of what science is and what good science is, 
are best sought by analyzing science as a special learning process. This focus on 
learning is distinct from both the focus on scientific knowledge and the focus on 
scientific social practice. 
 
 
Science as a cognitive system and as a social, communicational system 
In investigating science as a learning process, it is necessary to distinguish between two 
main aspects, research as the learning process of a cognitive system, and science as a 
social, communicational system (see further in Alrøe, 2000). Considering science as a 
cognitive system is most appropriate at the level of the researcher or the research unit, 
while seeing science as a communicational system is more appropriate at the level of the 
scientific community and the society.  
                                                 
6 In the history of demarcation, the positivistic distinction between science and 'metaphysics' employed 
'verifiability' as a criterion of meaning that designated scientific knowledge as meaningful and sensible as 
opposed to non-sensible metaphysics. Karl R. Popper claimed that his criterion of testability (or 
falsifiability or refutability) was not a criterion of meaning but a criterion of demarcation between science 
and non-science, and that metaphysics (the not testable, non-scientific knowledge) could therefore be 
sensible knowledge (e.g. Popper, 1998: 37ff, 255-58). However, Popper retains a focus on knowledge (on 
the theory or the theoretical system) and not on learning or method. That is, he sees demarcation as the 
question of which hypotheses or theories can be subjected to the scientific method of testing, and thereby 
perhaps falsified. We are interested in science as a learning process and in 'demarcating' better and worse 
ways of doing research. Demarcating science as a special learning process does not imply that scientists 
are different from other people, only that they employ certain methods. And the philosophical question of 
what might 'demarcate' scientific learning - what makes for good scientific learning - is still open. 
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Science shares common features with other learning processes, but it also has some 
distinct features. Common features are found when considering science as a cognitive 
system and scientific learning as, in some respects, similar to the learning of organisms. 
This is a naturalistic approach to science in line with John Dewey's theory of inquiry 
(e.g., Dewey, 1991: 30ff). We take such an approach as our starting point. The 
naturalistic approach does not imply that there is no difference between less complex 
and more complex kinds of cognition — only that there are common features and that 
something can be gained from investigating these features. Some of the differences 
between the learning process of science and that of an organism are to be found in the 
development of scientific research methods and technological tools. There are also 
different logical types of learning involved (Bateson, 1972: 279-308). Scientists and 
cognitive research systems are distinct from most organisms with respect to their 
potential for self-reflexive learning. And finally, as indicated above, science is distinct 
by being a social, communicational system based on openness to criticism. 
 
According to Dewey, cognition, or experience, is primarily about doing and interacting 
with the environment. Cognition cannot be understood independent of emotion and 
activity, and knowledge is therefore not something separate and self-sufficing (Dewey, 
1948: 84-87). As a basis for understanding research as a cognitive system we use a 
simple model of embodied cognition (see figure 1)7.  
 
 
(adaptive/intentional)
Representation
Acting
Perceiving
Cognitive
system
Umwelt
 
Figure 1:  A simple model of a cognitive system. The dotted arrow indicate a semiotic 
reference, the solid arrows indicate causal processes, and the thin lines indicate a 
systemic connection and coordination (Alrøe, 2000). 
 
 
                                                 
7 The model builds on Jacob von Uexküll's biological theory of meaning and his functional circle of 
behaviour (Uexküll, 1982: 32), see further in (Alrøe, 2000). 
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In the cognitive system, there is a representation of the world that involves a semiotic 
reference to the “Umwelt” (the phenomenal world of the system)8. The causal 
interaction with the world is divided into acting and perceiving in the model, and these 
two elements are connected to the representation. Hence, the use of the term 
“representation” in the model does not imply that the acting is controlled by way of 
some sort of map or depiction of the world, only that the acting and perceiving of the 
system is coordinated and to some degree refers to patterns outside the system. 
Furthermore, the representation entails meaning or significance for the system. That is, 
the representation involves both an “adaptive” aspect that refers to previous experience, 
and an “intentional”9 aspect that refers to future experience.  
 
Taken as a model of science, the model in figure 1 suggests a systemic conception of 
research, where the representation corresponds to our ideas about the world, acting 
corresponds to experimentation (or broader: intervention), and perceiving corresponds 
to observation. The adaptive aspect of representation can be identified with scientific 
knowledge (theories, models, descriptions) and the intentional aspect with the 
motivating goals, values, and interests in scientific inquiry. According to the model, 
these three elements (acting, perceiving, and representation) of cognitive learning are 
intimately connected, in the sense that scientific knowledge depends on the possibilities 
of experimentation (or intervention) and observation. Experimentation depends on the 
available knowledge and means of observation as well as on the values and interests 
employed in the research. And the possibilities of observation depend on the available 
knowledge and means of intervention.  
 
For example, investigating environmental problems often involves the use of indicators. 
Indicators are simple and feasible measures that are taken as signs of the state of the 
environment or of important driving forces in environmental change.10 These indicators 
are means of observation that both enforce and constrain the possibilities of learning 
about environmental changes. And the indicators are chosen with reference to specific 
intentions that are related to environmental goals and to conceptions of what counts as 
problematic issues (see, e.g., Bossel, 1999). 
 
The second main aspect of science as a learning process is science seen as a social, 
communicational system. This aspect has received more attention than the cognitive 
aspect of science, because it entails some of the distinctive features of science. 
 
In a philosophical perspective, one of the distinct features of scientific learning is the 
public nature of scientific communication and the critical approach of science, as 
emphasized by Karl Popper (e.g., 1998: 256). The critical approach is connected to a 
fallibilistic view of scientific knowledge and the conception of a community of 
inquirers, as found in the tradition of philosophical pragmatism (Peirce, 1868).  
                                                 
8 The German term 'Umwelt' is here used to designate the phenomenal world that an organism perceives 
and acts in accordance with. The usage of the German term in English comes from the field of 
biosemiotics, see for instance (Hoffmeyer, 1997). 
9 The meaning of 'intentional' here is in line with the everyday meaning of intention (as related to desire, 
value, purpose). It is not the specific philosophical notion of intentionality, which means 'being directed 
at'  or 'referring to' something. 
10 See e.g. (OECD, 1999) and examples of agricultural environmental indicators in (Hansen et al., 2001). 
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In his general theory of social systems, Niklas Luhmann describes science as one of the 
functional systems that are differentiated in modern society (e.g., Luhmann, 1989: 76ff). 
It is differentiated through a specific code of communication based on the difference 
between true and false. Luhmann states that:  
The code of scientific truth and falsity is directed specifically toward a communicative 
processing of experience, i.e., of selections that are not attributed to the communicators 
themselves[, and] . . . towards the acquisition of new scientific knowledge.  
(Luhmann, 1989: 77-78)  
 
In other words, Luhmann says that scientific communication is based on “objective 
experience.” In the next section, the notion of objectivity and the relationship between 
the value-laden aspects of research and the “objective experience” of scientific 
communication will be investigated. Further below, the question of how experience is 
'objectified' is described by means of a model of the self-reflexive circle of learning in 
systemic research. 
 
 
Objectivity and the method of science 
In the late 19th century, Charles S. Peirce gave a description of the general method of 
science that is still met with sympathy. Peirce states that inquiry is caused by the 
irritation of doubt and ends with the cessation of doubt. The sole object of inquiry is the 
settlement of opinion. Science is distinct from other methods of fixing belief, such as 
tenacity, authority, or a priori assumptions, because in science "our beliefs may be 
caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by something upon 
which our thinking has no effect." (Peirce, 1877). In other words, the beliefs of science 
are based on empirical evidence. Peirce also made clear the fundamental hypothesis 
behind the method of science:  
There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about 
them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensa-
tions are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantages of the laws 
of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and any man, if he 
have sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclu-
sion. 
(Peirce, 1877) 
And Peirce had developed a conception of truth and reality that takes this view of 
scientific method into its ideal consequence: Truth is the final opinion, towards which 
the communal mind of man is tending through scientific inquiry – on the whole and in 
the long run, despite all errors and individual peculiarities. Everything that will be 
thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else (Peirce, 1871). 
 
This view of scientific method still plays an important role in our understanding of 
science and Peirce is helpful in making it very clear that it is linked with a specific 
conception of reality. It seems obvious that truth and reality in Peirce's view can only 
concern the more permanent phenomena in the world, which are independent of human 
activity – such as the traditional subject areas of natural science. And, notably, this view 
is entailed in the conventional criteria of objectivity in science. 
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Eugene Freeman has given a fine description of the conventional conception of 
objectivity in science, which emphasizes that “the objective” is the external, that which 
is not self, and that it is defined as the opposite of the subjective:  
Factual objectivity is closely related to the ordinary language sense of objectivity, which 
presupposes the (uncritical) realistic distinction between mutually exclusive 'subjects' (or 
selves) and 'objects' (or not-selves). If we disregard for the moment the practical diffi-
culties of reaching ontological and epistemological agreement as to where the demarca-
tion line between the self and the not-self is to be drawn, we find the ordinary language 
meaning of 'objectivity', as given for example in Webster's unabridged dictionary, quite 
instructive. 'Object' is defined in one context as "The totality of external phenomena con-
stituting the not-self"; 'objectivity' is defined derivatively as "the quality, state, or relation 
of being objective"; and objective, in turn, is defined as "something that is external to the 
mind". Here 'subject' (or self, or mind) is the basic undefined term, in terms of which we 
can define objectivity as nonsubjectivity, in polar contrast to 'subjective', which means 
'that which is part of or inside of the self'. 
(Freeman and Skolimowski, 1974: 464-65) 
 
This view of objectivity has been challenged in one of the most prestigious areas of 
science, atomic physics. There are many other areas where the conventional conception 
of objectivity has been criticized, but the critique in atomic physics has more force as it 
is less prone to be dismissed by declaring the area non-scientific. There has been a 
longstanding discussion of the epistemological problems in atomic physics, with Niels 
Bohr as a leading figure. In Bohr's own account of the discussion with his main 
opponent on this issue, Albert Einstein, he explains how the discussion of the 
epistemological problems has shown that it is not possible to comprehend the evidence 
of quantum phenomena, obtained under different experimental conditions, within a 
single picture (Bohr, 1949). The evidence from different experiments must be regarded 
as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the 
possible information about the atomic objects. The complementary pictures of quantum 
phenomena are inseparable from the observational situation – it is impossible to 
separate the behavior of atomic objects from the interaction with the measuring 
instruments that serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear. And 
Bohr advocated the application of the very word phenomenon exclusively to refer to the 
observations obtained under specific circumstances, including an account of the whole 
experimental arrangement (Bohr, 1985: 27).  
 
This meant that Bohr had to dismiss the “realistic” presumption of a distinction between 
mutually exclusive subjects and objects entailed in the conventional conception of 
objectivity. Subsequently Bohr's “Copenhagen interpretation” of quantum theory was 
derided as “subjectivist.” But his philosophical analysis of the observational situation in 
atomic physics still stands, and it suggests a new conception of objectivity. According 
to Bohr, the inclusion of an account of the experimental arrangement and the results of 
observation in the language of everyday life and classical physics was the only way to 
provide an unambiguous description of the experiences in atomic physics, where the 
phenomena far transcend the classical physical experiences. And to Bohr, objectivity 
meant simply the unambiguous description of experiences. Furthermore he suggested 
that the situation in physical science was analogous to the situation as regards analysis 
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and synthesis of experience in many other fields of human knowledge and interest, such 
as psychology and life sciences.  
 
We follow Bohr. The conception of research as a cognitive system does not presuppose 
a distinction between subject and object. It focuses on the systemic connections of 
research. Below, a model of the experiential situation in research is outlined that makes 
the role of science as both actor and observer more explicit. This self-reflexive model 
forms the basis for understanding how the cognitive experience that is gained in 
research is “objectified.” 
 
 
The self-reflexive circle of learning in systemic research  
Looking at research as a cognitive system, we can picture the learning process of 
systemic research as a self-reflexive circle – a cyclic cognitive process including the 
representation of oneself as another (figure 2). This model is in analogy with human 
self-conscious learning based on the ability to take a mental step out and look upon 
oneself and one's actions from outside, and use this outside view in later action. Self-
reflection starts from the viewpoint, or stance, of the “actor” – the first order involved 
viewpoint of a cognitive system (with the capacity for self-reflection) – then it moves to 
a second order detached viewpoint where the “observer” views the system from 
outside11. And the observations made from this outside point of view can take effect 
upon returning to the first order viewpoint of the system.  
System Umwelt  /
      Environment
‘Observer’
‘Actor’
 
Figure 2:  The self-reflexive circle of learning in systemic research, moving from an 
inside actor viewpoint, or stance, to an outside observer viewpoint, and back.  
 
 
The distinction between inside and outside viewpoints has been widely, although not 
consistently, used in anthropology and other fields under the names emic (inside) and 
                                                 
11 Including observations of the cognitive system's first order observations – hence, 'second order', as in 
second order cybernetics (Foerster, 1984; Luhmann, 1989: 23ff). A fuller discussion of this is given in 
(Alrøe, 2000).  
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etic (outside).12 We prefer the terms actor and observer13, or the simple terms inside and 
outside viewpoint, for several reasons. First of all, they are easily understood and 
interpreted in a common way, as opposed to emic/etic, and they can be linked to the 
guiding metaphor of self-reflection in a straightforward way. It might be tempting to use 
the terms subjective and objective, but there is a load of connotations in those terms (as 
indicated above) that are better avoided in this context for the sake of conceptual 
precision. 
 
In our understanding, doing systemic research involves joggling these two different 
points of view. When a science recognizes itself as systemic, that is, as influencing its 
own subject area, this leads to reflection on how it interacts with the world. And the 
model in figure 2 can support this growth of reflexivity.  
 
Moving from an inside to an outside viewpoint entails that an overall distinction 
between the system and its environment needs to be made – the system has to be 
identified as an object of observation. This first movement also involves the 
determination, or at least presumption, of certain goals and values upon which the 
choices and delimitations that need to be made in planning and initiating research, can 
be made. The ensuing observations are thus based on these value-laden choices. These 
choices, together with the initial choice of system to be studied, determine the relevance 
of the research. The questions of for whom the research is done and what intentions 
guide the research are determined here. In other words, if the observations are to be part 
of a learning process for the observed system, or for some specific social system, the 
choices made need to reflect the values and goals in that system, because these choices 
can be decisive when the observations are later used in the development of the system 
(no matter whether the research unit realizes this or not). 
 
Sometimes the researchers are, in a sense, already within the system that they are 
researching, because they share the worldview, values, and goals present in the system 
in a way sufficient to initiate the research. But often there is a need for a reflexive 
determination and clarification of the inside point of view. There may be no single point 
of view to be found, but the research unit needs to settle on a specific point of departure 
in order to substantiate the research. In agricultural research, the inside view can be 
approached by way of interviews with farmers, consumers, and other stakeholders, or 
through participatory research, including public meetings, etc., which can provide some 
access to and representation of the values and discourses involved in the particular 
socio-ecological system being studied. On a more general scale, this involves 
institutional mechanisms for democratic participation in research and in the setting of 
research priorities (Middendorf and Busch, 1997). In a philosophical perspective, the 
values and interests of the actors can also be the subject of critical normative analysis as 
a means of establishing a coherent point of departure for research. 
                                                 
12 The terms emic and etic were introduced into linguistics and anthropology by Kenneth L. Pike, who 
generated these somewhat odd terms from the linguistic distinction between phonemic and phonetic. The 
emic/etic distinction was picked up by Marvin Harris who entrenched them into anthropology, see 
(Headland et al., 1990). See also Paul Thompson's (1995: 150ff) discussion of the emic/etic distinction in 
relation to agricultural sustainability.  
13 The terms actor and observer are used for instance by Luhmann (1989: 25) in connection with a second 
order cybernetic perspective on science, and by Jones & Nisbett  (1972) in social psychology, describing 
differences in the attribution of causes of behaviour.  
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The second movement, back to the inside viewpoint, may take direct or indirect paths, 
depending on the relation between the system and the research unit. In research as a 
cognitive learning process, a direct path is taken in the form of actions that transform 
the system. The indirect path goes by way of communication. As well recognized, the 
observer stance forms the basis for scientific communication. But the communicational 
learning process in science is dependent on the quality and adequacy of the connection 
to the underlying cognitive process. In other words, it is dependent on how the cognitive 
experience is “objectified.” 
 
Taking an outside viewpoint is the hallmark of science and also an indispensable part of 
systemic research. The outside viewpoint first of all detaches the interests and goals of 
the observer from the dynamics of the system. Moving from an inside to an outside 
view in systemic research, approaching the position of the “objective” observer, 
therefore allows for a distinction between dependent and independent dynamics in the 
learning process. The observed system dynamics are henceforth uninfluenced by the 
observer's intentions, and this allows the observer to learn about the independent 
dynamics of the system. But, given the self-reflexive circle of learning, the outside or 
“objective” stance always rests on a specific inside point of departure – it is not the 
privileged, detached, value-free, Archimedean point of observation that is entailed in the 
conventional criterion, or ideal, of objectivity. Therefore, the independence of the 
observed dynamics of the system can only be a conditional independence, an 
independence that is conditional on the choices made in order to take an outside 
viewpoint. 
 
Based on the understanding of research as the learning process of a cognitive system 
that has been presented above, the model of self-reflexive learning in figure 2 applies to 
all research. All research depends both on cognitive experience and the transformation 
of those experiences into scientific communication. In other words, all research starts 
with a complex system that embodies values, namely the research unit and its world. In 
laboratory research, the research unit acts in the construction of equipment and 
experiments.14 In the observational and historical sciences the research unit acts in the 
choice and development of tools of observation and the construction of coherent 
narratives. Research that considers itself only a detached observer of the world without 
also being an actor is thus blind to parts of its own function. On the other hand, research 
that operates only as an involved actor fails to be scientific.   
 
In a critical perspective, self-reflection allows research to make an “objective” 
description of the specific value-laden point of departure, which can be communicated 
as a part of the context of the observations. However, it is by no means an obvious or 
                                                 
14 Even in experimental and laboratory sciences, where the subject area does not involve other actors, 
there is an inside point of view. The researcher is always already within the system – in a simplistic 
account of an experiment, the researcher first meticulously constructs and sets up the experiment, then 
steps back to let the experiment take its independent course, and afterwards 'reads the meters'. 
Experimental science is therefore not 'entirely objective', it is an involved practice (cf. Pickering, 1995; 
Knorr Cetina, 1999). But the decisions made in experimental science may exclude external actors and be 
made solely on the basis of scientific values and the goals and interests of the researchers. And the control 
and delimitation of the experiment in laboratory science is constructed so that an observational stance 
towards the subject matter can be taken. 
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easy task to identify this context. The next section treats the intricate relationship 
between objectivity, context, and communication.  
 
 
“Reflexive objectivity,” relevance, and cognitive context  
The purpose of peer criticism in the scientific community (as opposed to the general 
discourse of society) is to subject the knowledge of the individual researcher or research 
group to the perspectives of other researchers, and thereby root out errors due to the 
influence of the individual perspectives and peculiarities.15 And, as stated above, one of 
the distinct features of scientific learning is the open, public nature of scientific 
communication. As generally recognized, however, peer criticism is only in principle 
open to the scientific community in general due to the specialization of science. In 
practice, peer criticism is therefore to some degree conditional on special knowledge 
and restricted to disciplines or sub-disciplines. However, if the scientific communication 
is to be even in principle open, it has to include sufficient context to be unambiguous, as 
stressed by Bohr. And, insofar as the value-laden context of scientific inquiry is an 
important aspect of the knowledge production of science, this aspect has also to be 
included in the scientific communication in order to maintain the ideal of openness. 
Even though this seems to be in conflict with the conventional scientific ideal of 
objectivity, which implies independence of contextual values. 
 
With reference to Luhmann and Bohr, the experience of the research unit becomes 
“objectified” by being transformed into scientific communication.16 In this transforma-
tion process, the researcher approaches the stance of an “ideal” observer so that this 
“objective experience,” in principle, can be shared with and criticized by any member of 
the scientific communicational community. The means of “objectifying” experience are 
the conventional scientific methods of documentation and control of observations and 
experiments, etc. In our view, this must also include a full documentation of the 
contextual background. The demarcation of science as a special learning process, we 
suggest, is the very ability to take an “objective” stance. Not the conventional, un-
reflected objectivity, which excludes the intentional and value-laden aspects of science, 
but a reflexive objectivity that includes these aspects and exposes their role17. The 
characteristic of reflexive objectivity is that the false assertion of value-freedom is 
considered less objective than the admittance of the contextual values and interests 
involved in research, because this context can be decisive for the learning process by 
way of the choices and delimitations made. The value-laden starting point should 
therefore be well described and clear, and included as a necessary context in the 
subsequent communication of “objective experiences.”  
 
                                                 
15 See also Helen Longino's discussion of the role of peer review (Longino, 1990: 68ff) 
16 Compare also Joseph Rouse's (1987: 77) analysis of Heidegger's theory of science, stating that 
Heidegger emphasises the transformation of language that occurs in science: "Science aims to produce 
assertions stripped of all indexicality", where indexicality refers to the connection beeween assertions and 
actual tasks or situations of research. In our perspective, the indexicality or contextuality is to be removed 
by way of clearly distinguishing and exposing the context in the scientific communication.  
17 In critiques of the concept of objectivity the term 'intersubjectivity' has been widely used. The term 
does capture the importance of shared context in scientific communication, but it fails to indicate that 
which is special in science - it might as well be a term used to describe the knowledge of a religious 
community or any other subculture of society. 
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Where the conventional criterion of objectivity seems to stand in opposition to the 
criterion of relevance, reflexive objectivity is interrelated with relevance through a 
common focus on context: Relevance concerns how the context of research is formed, 
and reflexive objectivity concerns how the context of research is exposed. In effect, 
reflexive objectivity demarcates the outer boundary of what is good science, while 
relevance determines the research that is actually to be performed. 
 
In the perspective of science as a self-reflexive learning process and the criterion of 
reflexive objectivity, the answers that science gives depend on the cognitive context.18 
The cognitive context can be divided into at least three levels (see Table 1). The societal 
context is the group or social system that the term “relevance” refers to, that is, those or 
that which the research is supposed to be relevant for (e.g., society, farmers, the third 
world, the market, the employer, the sponsor, or the scientific community). The 
intentional context consists of the goals and values that guide research, including what 
is taken as relevant problematic situations. The observational context includes the actual 
distinctions, delimitations, models, and technological constructions that are employed in 
research. That is, the means that are needed to perform research and obtain 
observations. When Bohr defined “phenomenon” as referring to the observations 
obtained under specific circumstances, he pointed to the observational context.  
 
 
Table 1: Three levels of cognitive context  
Level of context  Description Examples 
Societal  The social system that the 
term "relevance" refers to 
Society, particular social 
groups, the sponsor, science 
Intentional The values and goals that 
guide research   
Visions, aims, problems, etc. 
Observational Conceptual and technolo-
gical tools that are needed to 
perform specific research 
Cognitive schemata, 
concepts, models, 
instruments, labs, etc. 
 
 
We use the term “levels” as an indication of the structure of conditional independence 
of the observations and types of context. The observations are influenced by the 
observational context, while they are independent of the other levels of context given 
the observational. The observational context is influenced by the intentional context and 
it is independent of the social context given the intentional. And finally the intentional 
context is influenced by the societal. For instance, when considering research as a tool 
for developing organic agriculture, the societal context is first of all the organic 
movement. The organic movement has a set of rather explicit visions, values, and goals 
that frame the intentional context. And this, at least to some extent, determines the 
observational context. On the other hand, some of the organic values are relevant in a 
                                                 
18 Part of this cognitive context is what Thomas S. Kuhn first termed 'paradigms' and later, in his 
Postscript to "The structure of scientific revolutions" (Kuhn, 1996: 182ff), described as the 'disciplinary 
matrix', which includes 'symbolic generalisations', 'metaphysical paradigms', scientific values, and 
'exemplars' of concrete problem-solutions. 
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wider societal context. And the research that is actually performed can very well be 
relevant to other farming traditions with other goals and values. 
 
Usually, peer criticism is primarily directed towards the relation between the research 
results and the observational context. However, given the above structuring of the 
context of research, there is also a role for critique of how the observational context is 
related to the intentional context (as it is commonly done in applied sciences). For 
example, is the intentional context made clear? Do the chosen approaches, methods, and 
concepts address the problematic situation or the expressed goals and values in a fruitful 
way? The meaning of the evaluative and normative concepts that are used in science, 
such as soil quality, animal welfare, and sustainability, is a well-known problematic 
issue. The exposure of the values embedded in the usage of such concepts is an 
important aspect of reflexive objectivity. There is furthermore a role for critique of how 
the intentional context is related to the societal context. For example, do the stated 
goals, values, and problems reflect the concerns of the social systems that the research is 
to be relevant for? Is the funding of the research made clear or hidden? 
 
In addition to peer criticism, which concerns the exposure of the cognitive context and 
the coherence of context and results in relation to reflexive objectivity, there is a role for 
public criticism, which directly concerns the contextual values: Is the exposed context 
found to be relevant?  
 
Peer criticism is often conceived as the peer review of papers as part of the publishing 
process. But there is an important role for criticism in other parts of the research 
process. In particular, new research projects are determined through a process that 
involves politics and funding. In this process, the relevance of research can be improved 
by way of exposure and communication of the suggested cognitive context. The task of 
making clear and criticizing the intentional context and the relation to the societal 
context involves value inquiry. This is not an easy or straightforward task, but it is a 
substantial and important element in a systemic research methodology. 
 
It is argued above that, given a particular well-described observational context, the 
values and intentions that led to this particular setup will not influence the results19. If 
this is so, one might ask why we should care about the intentional context. Exposing the 
intentional context is, however, an important background for seeing the particular 
observational context, and the “objective” knowledge that is gained, in a larger 
perspective. It will facilitate the coordination and cooperation with other research that 
has a compatible intentional context, and allow groups with certain values to identify 
research that is compatible with those values and use the research with confidence in the 
relevance of the results. Similarly, exposing the societal context (e.g., for whom is the 
research done, funding, etc.) will allow for a normative and political discourse on the 
intentional context and thereby provide the structure that enables the functioning of 
science as a genuine learning process for society.  
 
Some might argue that values should, in fact, not play a role in the method of science, 
because there is only one objective scientific approach to any given problem, or because 
                                                 
19 In fact, this is a key characteristic of taking an objective stance in scientific learning. 
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science is not a problem-driven but an explorative, descriptive enterprise. These 
arguments build on a very narrow conception of science that disregards the role of 
science as a tool for action and development (the distinction between descriptive and 
developmental science is further explored in the next section). There is always a 
(reflected or un-reflected) choice of subject matter or research issue in science. If 
science is seen as problem-driven and a tool for action, this choice depends on what is 
taken as problematic, and this involves goals, interests, and values. And even the 
enterprise of “pure science” entails certain values that may be questioned in relation to 
the role of science in society.   
 
Values also play a role in the method or approach employed in addressing a specific 
problematic issue. The delimitations and reductions employed and the choice of 
methods are intertwined with value-laden issues. As a fictional example, let us imagine 
the general problem of fungus diseases in wheat crops (a problematic issue that already 
presumes certain values and perspectives). There are many ways to do research in 
regard to this problem:  
- you can develop pesticides that are (more or less selectively) effective against fungi  
- you can search for and breed new sorts of wheat that are more resistant towards 
fungi, or use genetic engineering to develop wheat that is toxic towards fungi 
- you can investigate different agricultural practices (in terms of levels of fertilisers, 
etc.) that make the wheat more resistant towards fungi  
- you can investigate different agricultural production systems where the wheat is less 
prone to get fungus diseases in the first place (through crop diversity, landscape 
diversity, etc.)  
- you can investigate the use of other crops than wheat 
- or you may even investigate other land uses than crop production, depending on the 
interests and goals of society and stakeholders.  
 
Such choices are made in research initiation, and the choice of approach or method 
indicates something about the intentional context that is (knowingly or unknowingly) 
employed. The relevance of the research depends on whether these choices correspond 
to the values present in agriculture and society, or whatever specific intentional and 
societal context “relevance” refers to.  
 
To sum up, relevance is concerned with research as a tool for development with respect 
to certain groups with certain goals, interests, and values, while reflexive objectivity is 
concerned with making clear the context of the learning process. The criterion of 
reflexive objectivity suggests that research should investigate and describe its own 
societal, intentional, and observational context and work explicitly with the goals and 
values involved, in order to facilitate peer criticism and the use and critique by different 
users and stakeholders. In particular, research should describe the choices made in 
research initiation, the delimitations and constraints these choices place on the results, 
and the areas of ignorance that this implies, as an essential context of the results 
produced. Such changes in the norms of science cannot be implemented by single 
researchers or research groups. Their successful implementation involves all the 
different institutional structures of science, such as the organizational structures of 
research, the media of publication, the structures of research policy and funding, the 
educational institutions, etc. 
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Distinctions and boundaries in science – towards a common frame-
work that can form a ground for transdisciplinary systemic research  
 
In the previous section, a unitary view of science as a learning process has been 
developed. This view does not presuppose different kinds of science, such as the 
established division between natural, social and human science. A second important 
perspective for a systemic research methodology is therefore the relation between the 
different and often quite separate disciplines in the highly fragmented science of today. 
In order for science to function as a common learning process, there is a need for a 
common framework that can serve as a basis for doing transdisciplinary systemic 
research. 
 
The “boundary work” of science (Gieryn, 1983), the actual demarcations of science 
from non-science that science employs in the pursuit of its professional goals, has 
implications for the conditions for doing transdisciplinary systemic research, which 
needs to work across the established boundaries of science. Cross-disciplinary research 
is often hampered by the idea that reductive science is more objective, and hence more 
scientific, than the less reductive sciences of complex subject areas – and by the 
opposite idea that reductive science is necessarily reductionistic20. This has led to an 
unfruitful opposition between“reductionist” and “holistic” science in connection with, 
for instance, agricultural and ecological research (see, e.g., Lockeretz and Anderson, 
1993: 65-69; Thompson, 1995: 118ff; Rowe, 1997). 
 
From the holist (or anti-reductionist) point of view, analytic, reductive methods are bad 
science because they do not capture the connectedness of complex reality. And 
reductionist science is (in part) to blame for the present agricultural and environmental 
problems. From the reductionist point of view, analytic, reductive methods ensure the 
quality of science, and other methods are, therefore, not scientific. 
 
Two comments are pertinent here. First, the cognitive model of research that has been 
outlined in this paper, implies that the world is always “reduced” in cognition – the 
phenomenological world is not “the real world,” whether it is the world of a frog or of 
                                                 
20 The area of reductionism is very complex, but it seems appropriate to at least give an outline of the 
issue here. It is common to distinguish between three types of reductionism: ontological (or constitutive, 
metaphysical), epistemological (or theoretical) and methodological (or explanatory) reductionism, in 
accordance with Francisco J. Ayala (1974;  see also Longino, 1990: 225ff; Thompson, 1995: 129ff). 
Metaphysical reductionism is the idea that one or few entities and processes underlie all phenomena. 
Theoretical reductionism is the idea that all scientific theories can in principle be reduced to one super-
theory (usually in physics). Methodological reductionism is the idea that complex phenomena can in 
principle be explained in terms of more general laws and simpler entities. 
Taken literally, we consider all these forms of reductionism to be faulty. In a more restricted sense they 
do, however, have some merit. Metaphysical reductionism in the sense of an evolutionary metaphysics is 
the working hypothesis of most modern science. Theoretical reduction can be achieved in more specific 
areas, though it might be practical to retain the reducible theories. Methodological reduction is a useful 
strategy as long as the effects of reduction are taken into consideration.   
Thompson (1995: 131) further distinguish between these forms of scientific reductionism and ethical 
reductionism. The latter is the idea that there is a sharp and inviolable distinction between facts and 
values, and that this distinction entails that science is "neutral" and has no implications for ethics (and 
vice versa). We clearly hold ethical reductionism to be faulty.  
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science. Hence the term “holistic” seems to promise more of science and cognition than 
can be fulfilled. Second, since reduction is a powerful approach in science that can 
contribute significantly to the learning process, the term “reductionist” should be used 
only where a science is un-aware of the consequences of reduction or denies that there 
are any such consequences. Given an evolutionary metaphysics that asserts the reality of 
emergence (see, e.g., Emmeche et al., 1997), reductionist science is to be regarded as 
bad science. Given even the hypothesis that there are emergent phenomena, a science 
that does not investigate what may be left out in reduction, does not meet the quality 
criterion of reflexive objectivity.  
 
The condition for avoiding reductionism is a reflexive awareness of the observational 
context, including the analytic methods. The conditions for being “wholeness-
oriented”21 are, in addition, a reflexive awareness of the role of specific disciplines and 
research activities in relation to the larger wholes or systems that are found to entail 
problematic issues (e.g., environmental problems), and an awareness of the role of 
science in society. In the perspective of organic agriculture, which takes the 
connectedness of the world as a basic presumption and the independence of things as 
something special, there is a particular emphasis on the problems related to science 
being fragmented by disciplinary specialization without enough awareness of the need 
for interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary22 work and for methodological and 
organizational structures that can facilitate such work.  
 
Our conception of science as systemic and the promotion of wholeness-orientation is 
largely in congruence with Michael Gibbons et al.'s (1994: 19) description of how the 
production of knowledge (scientific learning) is advancing into a new phase. From the 
conventional natural science-like knowledge production (Mode 1) has evolved a new 
mode (Mode 2), which continues to exist alongside the old mode. Mode 1 is discipline-
based and carries a distinction between basic and applied sciences, with a linear 
operational relation between a fundamental theoretical core of knowledge and its 
practical use in applied sciences.23  By contrast, Mode 2 knowledge production is 
                                                 
21 'Wholeness-oriented' is a literal translation of a term (helhedsorienteret) often used in Danish as a 
replacement for 'holistic'. The term holistic is, although widely used in some areas, not a very clear term 
for describing reflexive and wholeness-oriented science. It has connotations that conceal the facts that 
cognition can never be holistic in the sense that it 'captures the whole world', and that science must 
involve a detached, 'observational' stance in order for scientific communication to take place.    
22 These terms can be defined in the following way, with reference to Erich Jantsch (1972) (here from 
Gibbons et al., 1994: 28-29). Multidisciplinary: Disciplines working on the same problem or issue are 
autonomous and the work does not lead to changes in the existing disciplinary and theoretical structures. 
Interdisciplinary: The disciplines work on different themes but with a common framework, or 
methodology. Transdisciplinary: The interdisciplinary work is accompanied by a mutual interpenetration 
of disciplinary methodology and theory, and leads to a common theoretical understanding. The 
transdisciplinary work presumes self-reflection in the different disciplines on their role in the resolution 
of problematic issues and their relation to other disciplines. And transdisciplinary work thereby 
transforms the disciplines involved. 'Transdisciplinary' is also sometimes used in an even stronger sense, 
where the integration of science and 'real world' practice is emphasised. 
23 In the politics and statistics of science the distinction between 'basic' and 'applied' science is a 
widespread conventional distinction, which has been institutionalised in form of OECD's so-called 
Frasceti Manual (see e.g. Stokes, 1997). This distinction is based on whether there is a practical objective 
with the research or not, and implies a linear model of the use of knowledge from basic sciences in the 
applied sciences. The idea is found both in natural science (e.g. physics as a basic science and engineering 
as an applied science) and, at least to some extent, in the cultural sciences (e.g. the distinction between 
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transdisciplinary – it is characterized by a constant flow back and forth between the 
basic and the applied, between the theoretical and the practical. In Mode 2, more 
emphasis is placed on contextualized results and less on the search for fundamental 
principles, and the processes of discovery are integrated with those of fabrication. 
Where the problems of science in Mode 1 are set largely by the academic interests of a 
scientific community, Mode 2 is fuelled by practical problems in specific contexts, 
involving heterogeneous groups of participants. 
 
In the following, the unitary view of science as a learning process is linked to a 
framework that can assist transdisciplinary work. The framework locates different kinds 
of science in accordance with the kind of motivation or interest behind the research and 
their main methodological characteristics. 
 
 
Classifications of science based on motivation and methodology  
The notions of systemic science, wholeness-oriented research, and Mode 2 knowledge 
production seem to capture essential features of an important shift in the conception of 
what science is as well as in the general methodology and structure of science. The shift 
may also involve changes in how science is divided into different kinds. This shift is 
related to the involvement of science in new complex areas, such as the socio-ecological 
problems of society and environment. Here, different disciplines such as ethics, 
sociology, ecology, and chemistry ought to be in close cooperation. This is not often the 
case.  
 
Our main interest in reflecting on the distinctions between different kinds of science is 
therefore methodological: How can different kinds of science cooperate in such 
complex research areas? Which distinctions need to be taken into account and which 
can be dismissed as historical relics? These questions involve critical analyses of what 
the proper distinctions of science are, as a means to promote the operation of research 
across the perceived boundaries of science.   
 
Donald Stokes has recently, in a discussion of the basic/applied distinction, suggested a 
distinction between four kinds of science that is based on two dimensions of motivating 
factors for research: the considerations of use and the quest for fundamental 
understanding of the causes of phenomena (Stokes, 1997; see also Whitley, 2000: xx-
xxi).24 Stokes's critique of the basic/applied distinction is well taken, and his 
identification of two different dimensions in this distinction seems to address a real 
                                                                                                                                               
theoretical or normative ethics and applied ethics). The dimension of practical usability can be further 
divided with for example strategic research in between basic and applied, and with experimental 
development as the application of existing knowledge towards a specific objective. Another related 
distinction recognises that basic science is also oriented towards use, but with different users (or societal 
context): fundamental research is oriented towards the scientific community, strategic research is oriented 
towards a broad class of users in society including researchers, and directed research is oriented towards 
the sponsoring organisation (see Stokes, 1997: 68 ). 
24 Research with no considerations of use becomes divided into pure basic research (Bohr's quadrant) and 
classificatory research (which could be called Linnaeus' quadrant), while the applications-oriented 
research is divided into use-inspired basic research (Pasteur's quadrant), which includes strategic research, 
and pure applied  research (Edison's quadrant). 
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problem with it. There are, however, some difficulties in his fourfold classification.25 
The dimension of being motivated by a quest for fundamental understanding seems to 
conflate two different methodological dimensions of science, the degree of reduction 
and the degree of observational detachment. We shall return to this in a moment.  
 
As for the motivating factors of science, we agree that the basic kinds of interests in 
doing science may distinguish different types of science. But the motivations that 
Stokes refers to (use and fundamental understanding) seem to be restricted to natural 
science and therefore not sufficiently general.  
 
In an analysis of the relation between knowledge and interest, Jürgen Habermas (1972: 
302-3, 308-10) distinguishes between three kinds of science. This is a distinction that 
might resemble the traditional distinction between natural, human and social sciences, 
but it is one that is not based on the character of the subject area. Habermas's distinction 
refers both to methodology (“the character of the logical-methodological rules”) and to 
motivations (“knowledge-constitutive, or cognitive, interests”). The three kinds of 
science are 1) the empirical-analytical sciences with a cognitive interest in technical 
control over objectified processes, 2) the historical- hermeneutic sciences with a 
practical cognitive interest directed towards mutual understanding and meaning, and 3) 
the systematic sciences of social action with an emancipatory cognitive interest. These 
latter sciences, including economy, sociology, and political science, not only produce 
nomological knowledge of causes and laws — they are also critical social sciences by 
way of the method of self-reflection in society, because self-reflection "releases the 
subject from dependence on hypostatized powers" (1972: 310). The very awareness of 
the causal mechanisms allows for the liberation from these mechanisms. Critically 
oriented sciences share this emancipatory cognitive interest and the method of self-
reflection with philosophy.  
 
We follow Habermas in acknowledging the dependence of science on cognitive 
interests and agree that there is no “pure knowledge” – that knowledge is always 
connected with interest, and that it can only become “objective” and decontextualized 
by including and revealing the context. But we take a slightly different view of the 
connection between different kinds of science and cognitive interests. We suggest a 
distinction between only two different, but interacting, general cognitive interests: A 
normative interest, which seeks to establish meaning in form of ideas on the valuable 
and the good (corresponding to Habermas's practical interest), and an empirical interest, 
which seeks to establish descriptive and predictive knowledge with regard to contem-
plation, social action, and technical control. The two different cognitive interests 
correspond to the two different aspects of the cognitive representation of the world in 
figure 1. The normative interest is intentional or forward-looking and concerned with 
the choice of future potential courses of action (knowing what to choose in an open 
                                                 
25 Having considerations of use as a motivation for doing research often does not correspond to the actual 
usefulness of research. This is one of the reasons why 'pure research' – as the idea of an autonomously 
guided science – has been held in such esteem, because it often shows up to be practically valuable in 
unpredicted ways. And where researchers are motivated by a quest for fundamental understanding, the 
financing organisations may very well support the research based on expectations of useful spin-offs, as 
also noted by Stokes himself. We would therefore prefer to speak of relevance as a fundamental criterion 
referring to 'considerations of use', which can be met by both 'basic' and 'applied' research although in 
different ways, with different contexts.  
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world). The empirical interest is adaptive or backward-looking and concerned with 
description, classification, and prediction of general, habitual, and law-like phenomena 
(knowing what is given — and what is open).  
 
The empirical interest includes both Habermas's technical and emancipatory cognitive 
interests, which we consider to differ only in degree, and not in kind, due to differences 
in the reduction of the subject matter. That is, the cognitive interest is the same, but 
there is a difference between more reductive and less reductive sciences.26 Apart from 
being predictive, the knowledge of natural laws is also “emancipatory” in making it 
possible to take these laws into account in technical control. And the knowledge of 
social laws or habits is also predictive, apart from making it possible to seek to change 
or overcome those laws. Any knowledge of general and lawful phenomena offers both 
prognostic and transformative abilities, in that it indicates both what is given and what 
is open. With a dramatic example, the prediction of a meteor hitting the earth also offers 
the possibility of changing its course. Furthermore, the recognition of a general 
phenomenon suggests the possibility of changing the general. But this option is highly 
dependent on the nature of the subject area. Laws and habits can only be changed by 
way of changing the underlying static structures upon which the lawful dynamics are 
based. And this may be prohibited by lack of power or by ethical concerns. 
 
Accordingly, we do not follow Habermas's distinction between three kinds of science. 
Basically, we suggest, there are only two kinds of science: the empirical27 and the 
normative sciences, corresponding to the two cognitive interests. The empirical sciences 
produce descriptive and predictive knowledge referring to actual, habitual and potential 
phenomena (how the world is, will be, and can be). The normative sciences produce 
prescriptive knowledge, that is, meaning and ideas on the good referring to how we 
want the world to be. More precisely, these can be called two aspects of science, 
because the one builds on the other and vice versa. Both technical control and critical 
social action presume that some meaning or vision of the good is already established in 
the form of explicit or implicit values and norms. And conversely, any practical idea of 
the good must build on empirical knowledge of the possible, because only the future 
courses that are possible can be chosen and actualized in action. 
 
The distinction between empirical and normative sciences does not correspond to any of 
the traditional distinctions between natural, social, and human sciences. In this view, 
which is closely related to that of Joseph Rouse (1987: 169f, 198-208), the natural and 
social sciences are not seen as different kinds of science, but as science done in different 
areas with different degrees of reduction, where there are different conditions for 
experimentation, manipulation, and control.  
 
 
                                                 
26 The term 'reductive science' here denotes a science that operates with a (relatively more) reduced 
subject area ('research world'), by way of abstraction or physical control and restriction. 
27 We use the common term 'empirical' despite reluctance towards the connotation to empiricism. 
'Epistemic' might be an alternative term. As indicated in figure 1, we do not consider experience to be that 
which is given through the senses. 
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A framework for the cooperative understanding of different kinds of science 
We now return to the question of basic methodological differences between different 
kinds of science, speaking first of the empirical aspect of science. 
 
If we look at, for instance, laboratory research, field experiments, on-farm research, and 
sociological research in agriculture, they are different with respect to the reduction and 
abstraction of the subject matter (that is, the complexity of the “research world”), and 
subsequently in the conditions for experimentation and control, and thereby for 
replications or reproductions of phenomena. They are also different with respect to the 
need for ethical considerations. As stated above, there has been a more or less tacit 
conception of science, where systemic approaches that include, for example, the human 
and social parts of the agricultural systems into their research world, are perceived as 
less scientific than conventional, analytical approaches, which have reduced their 
research worlds to exclude those aspects of reality. There are obvious differences 
between agricultural systems research and analytical chemistry, for example, but 
sciences in some subject areas are not necessarily more scientific than sciences in other 
areas — there is no necessary difference in the potential for doing good science in more 
and less reduced subject areas. And in a learning perspective, the possibility for doing 
good science does not increase with the amount and “solidity” of existing knowledge 
and theories.  
 
We want here to outline a common framework of science that shows the methodological 
differences between different kinds of research, and the implications of these 
differences, where they can be seen as having the same potential for being “scientific.” 
Both the benefits and costs of reduction need to be addressed.  
 
The important methodological dimensions of such a common framework are, first, the 
dimension of more or less reduced “research worlds” and, second, the dimension of 
detached observational knowledge versus involved experimental action. The latter 
dimension refers to the two stances of the learning circle (figure 2), the detached 
observer stance, where general “objective” knowledge can be generated, and the 
involved actor stance, where decisions and actions actually take place in specific 
contexts. With respect to the first dimension, the reduction of subject matter in science 
involves a construction of a simplified research world by way of abstraction and 
metaphorical construal (“gedankenexperimente”) and mostly also by way of physical 
delimitation, manipulation, and control (classical experimental science). The conception 
of reduced research worlds is in line with Joseph Rouse (1987; see also Latour, 1983), 
who rethinks the role of laboratories in our understanding of science.  
Fundamentally, a laboratory is a locus for the construction of phenomenal microworlds. 
Systems of objects are constructed under known circumstances and isolated from other 
influences so that they can be manipulated and kept track of. They constitute attempts to 
circumvent the chaotic complexity . . .  by constructing artificially simplified 'worlds'. In 
these microworlds there exists only a limited variety of objects, whose provenance is 
known and whose forms of interaction are strictly constrained.  
(Rouse, 1987: 101) 
 
The common framework of science that emerges from the above considerations is 
illustrated in figure 3 and 4 (figure 3 only shows the empirical aspect of science). The 
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two methodological dimensions span the framework: vertically the more or less 
reductive sciences, with the very reduced research worlds at the top, and horizontally 
the involved and the detached stance.28 The triangular form represents the effect of 
reducing complexity and working with restricted research worlds. The more detached, 
observational kinds of research can be classificatory (more reduced worlds) or 
descriptive and historical (less reduced worlds). And the more involved, experiential 
kinds of research can be experimental (more reduced worlds) or developmental (less 
reduced worlds).29 In highly reduced research worlds (such as the world of high energy 
physics), the classificatory and experimental sciences are so closely connected that they 
cannot be separated and hardly distinguished. In less reduced worlds, on the other hand, 
the descriptive and developmental sciences are very different and hardly seen as 
connected.  
 
   Developmental 
science and research
     Historical and 
descriptive sciences
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ifi
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nc
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General laws
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change
More reduced
research worlds
Less reduced
research worlds
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Figure 3:  An illustration of the relation between different types of empirical science. 
The framework is spanned by two key methodological dimensions of science, the 
reduction of the research world and the involved versus detached stance. The triangular 
form shows the effect of reduction.  
                                                 
28 The self-reflexive model of learning (figure 2) suggests that the learning process in research should 
involve both stances, and therefore involves a movement in this horizontal dimension. The self-reflexive 
model is common for both highly reductive and less reductive sciences (though the implications are 
different due to for instance the absence or presence of other actors in the research world) and therefore 
the two dimensions are considered orthogonal. 
29 The distinction between basic and applied science focuses on experimental science, and can be aligned 
with the more and less reduced sciences along the right side of the triangle in figure 3. The left side of the 
triangle corresponds to the division of the sciences made by the 19th century German philosopher 
Wilhelm Windelband (1998), who considered the natural sciences to be 'nomothetic': seeking laws behind 
the phenomena as types, and the human sciences (esp. history) to be 'idiographic': describing the special 
traits of specific phenomena. In the same vein, his contemporary Charles Peirce distinguished between 
nomological, classificatory, and descriptive sciences (Peirce, 1903). The triangle combines these two 
perspectives on science and in this respect it implies the thesis, that nomothetic sciences entail both 
classificatory and experimental research activities.   
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Figure 4: A common framework of science with some examples of different disciplines and types of research. The two faces of the pyramid 
represent the empirical and normative aspects of science. The faces are spanned by two key methodological dimensions of science, the 
reduction of the research world and the involved versus detached stance. The pyramidal form shows the effect of reduction. 
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In figure 4, the normative aspect of science is included. The two aspects of science, the 
empirical and the normative, are shown as two faces of a pyramidal structure.30 Each 
face is spanned by the two methodological dimensions. In this framework, some 
examples of different disciplines and types of research are indicated that are of 
relevance to systemic research in agriculture. With respect to other subject areas, other 
examples would be appropriate. Even though the examples are placed on one of the two 
faces, none are purely empirical or purely normative. Every actual field of science has 
both normative and empirical aspects even though the focus may be entirely on one or  
the other. In particular, among the highly involved systemic or developmental sciences, 
action research has substantial normative aspects and political theory has substantial 
empirical aspects.  
 
Among the more reductive normative sciences are the sciences of good thinking (logic) 
and good inquiry (normative theory of science). In the latter, we locate the systemic 
research methodology that is outlined in the present paper.31  
 
Moving upwards in the empirical triangle can be aligned with seeking a reductive, 
causal explanation of a phenomenon, while moving towards the detached can be aligned 
with seeking a classification or a communicable description of a phenomena. “General 
laws,” such as the natural laws of physics, can be taken as the extreme expression of the 
method of reduction in science, providing an ideal causal explanation. They represent a 
general knowledge that is valid everywhere, but it is only valid given the constraining 
presumptions in the reduced research world.32 If you let an egg fall from the leaning 
                                                 
30 Some might wonder about the other sides of the pyramid. They do bear some meaning. Hidden below 
the pyramid is the un-reduced world, which we can never fully uncover. On the back side of the pyramid 
we find the hypothetical aspects of science, including fields of science such as mathematics (with a highly 
reduced research world), science fiction, counterfactual history, scenario building, utopian visions, and 
similar more or less recognised hypothetical sciences. Our view of logic as a basic normative science and 
mathematics as a basic hypothetical science is inspired by Peirce's classification of sciences (Peirce, 
1903).  
31 The theory of reflexive systemic research is a universal theory in Niklas Luhmann's sense, that is, a 
theory that includes itself in its subject area. Luhmann (1995: 486-87) recognised the involvement of 
sociology in its subject area and established a universal self-referential theory of social systems, which 
can account for sociology itself as an object in its subject area. "A universal theory … does not 
presuppose any epistemological criteria from outside. Instead … it relies on a naturalistic epistemology. 
Again, this means that its own epistemic procedure and its acceptance or rejection of validating criteria 
for this, happens within its own domain of research" (Luhmann, 1995:xlviii). Universality in this sense 
does not entail a claim for 'completeness' or exclusivity in relation to competing endeavours. According to 
Luhmann, the cutting line does not run between natural sciences and cultural sciences 
(Geisteswissenshaften) but between theories, such as his own, with a claim to universality, and which 
involve themselves in self-referential processes as a result, and more limited research theories, which 
concern thematically bounded sections of the world.  
32 The issue of reductionism can be seen as a question concerning explanation. Is the explanation given by 
some science comprehensive? An explanation of x is a reference to a cause of x. A cause of x is 
something without which x would not be. So the question of reductionism can, at least in part, be framed 
in terms of forms of causality. The modern conception of scientific explanation implies the reference to a 
general law together with relevant 'initial conditions'. The limitations of causal explanations can thus be 
discussed in terms of 'systemic causation' or 'downward causation' (Andersen et al., 2000). Aristotle 
distinguished four kinds of cause or 'explanatory feature', which are usually termed material, formal, 
efficient and final cause. In relation to the present framework the material cause can be answered by 
reductive methods. The efficient cause may or may not be revealed by reduction. The formal cause is 
connected to classification and thus involves a detached stance. The final cause cannot be answered by 
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tower of Pisa, it will (largely) fall in accordance with the laws of gravity. If you let a 
feather fall, more complex laws interfere. If you let a swallow fall, the laws of gravity 
play only a minor role in explaining what happens. 
 
In more complex worlds, the epistemological limitation with regard to using causal 
knowledge from reduced worlds is that some aspects are neglected because of the 
reduction.33 Some examples of neglected aspects are the crop rotation effects when 
doing research on single fields; the effects on farm economics when doing research on 
cropping systems (e.g., Olesen, 1999); the management factor when studying farm 
dynamics in experimental farming systems or in the assessment of animal welfare (e.g. 
Sandøe et al., 1997); or the role of motivation (intention) in behavioural studies (e.g. 
Brier, 1998).  
 
Conversely, the methodological and technical limits of doing research in more complex 
research worlds are due to the complexity and variety of the research world and the 
diversity and individuality of the entities. For example, it is very difficult to make a 
general predictive model of a complex world – in particular if the world involves self-
reflexive actors, such as persons and their social systems, that learn, adapt, and change 
course in accordance with the knowledge they gain from that model.34 There are also 
ethical limits to research in complex worlds, connected to the presence of human and 
non-human actors in the research world that the research system has a moral 
responsibility to take into consideration and, in the case of persons, involve in a moral 
discourse (see also Latour and Woolgar, 1979: 256-57). In this perspective, reduction 
entails (apart from methodological benefits) that the ethical questions are externalized – 
they become part of the external communications of science and the actual research can 
be done without ethical considerations. In a wider systemic perspective, however, where 
science is seen as a part of society and nature, and with reference to the criterion of 
                                                                                                                                               
reduction, but only by way of an involved stance. See also the discussion of a broader framework of 
causal explanation that refers to the Aristotelian types of causality in Emmeche et al. (2000). 
33 In the context of evolutionary systems theory the question of  reduction is discussed in terms of the 
ontological concepts of 'ontological levels' and 'emergence', see for instance (Emmeche et al., 1997; 
Køppe, 1990). Three main ontological levels from a cybernetic systems point of view are the physical 
level, the biological level (adaptive and cognitive systems) and the intellectual level (self-reflexive 
systems).   
34 Ian Hacking (1999: 103-8) distinguishes between 'interactive kinds' and 'indifferent kinds', where 
interactive kinds show a 'looping effect' in that they can become aware of how they are classified and 
rethink themselves accordingly. Hacking suggests that a cardinal difference between natural and social 
sciences are that the classifications employed in natural science are indifferent kinds, while those 
employed in social sciences are interactive kinds. We disagree with Hacking that "the targets of natural 
science are stationary" (Hacking, 1999: 108), and in his distinction of natural and social sciences. But we 
agree that self-awareness and the resulting 'looping effects' are important features in relation to the 
methodological as well as the ethical concerns of science (ontological levels are not independent of 
normative considerations – part of what makes certain ontological levels important is their ethical 
relevance).  
We would argue that there are three main ontological 'kinds' (in accordance with the three levels in the 
previous note), which we may call indifferent, adaptive and self-reflexive kinds. The latter one shows the 
kind of looping effect that Hacking suggests. However, this looping effect is only one of the more 
obvious circular effects that show up in a general systemic conception of science. Science interacts with 
its subject matter in other ways. An example concerning indifferent kinds is the global warming effect 
following development of fossil fuel technology. An example concerning adaptive kinds is the 
development of resistance in microbial pathogens following development of antibiotics. 
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relevance or (more generally) given a theory of moral responsibility for actions (Jonas, 
1984; Alrøe and Kristensen, 2001), there can be decisive ethical concerns connected 
with the potential consequences of reductive science.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Society's demand for more wholeness-orientation in (for instance) agricultural research 
implies a critique of traditional disciplinary research that is not well suited to handle 
cross-disciplinary problems. And it implies a critique of the sciences that have 
difficulties with handling the criteria of relevance because they aspire to the scientific 
ideal of being value-free and independent of social interests. There is, however, no 
established alternative research methodology that can meet the demand for wholeness-
orientation.  
 
In this paper, we have taken some steps towards a systemic research methodology for 
agricultural science and similar sciences. That is, a methodology for doing wholeness-
oriented research that can meet the challenges facing science in complex research areas 
that involve human actors and social and ecological systems. An important aspect of 
this methodology is the role of values. Science is neither value-free nor independent. 
The important questions are what the role of values is and how science interacts with its 
subject area and with society. Values play an important role in science — not only in 
normative sciences such as ethics and theory of science, but also in empirical sciences. 
This view necessitates a revision of the conventional ideal of objectivity.  
 
The systemic research methodology builds on a unitary and inclusive view of science as 
a societal learning process that gives a new foundation for discussing the function of 
different kinds of science and how they can cooperate. Based on this view, two main 
criteria for doing good science are suggested, relevance and reflexive objectivity. 
Wholeness-orientation does not imply a dismissal of traditional disciplinary science. 
But it does imply that the consequences of reduction must be included in the answers 
that reductive science provides. Good science exposes and communicates the cognitive 
context of research, including the societal, the intentional, and the observational context, 
in order to achieve good and valid communication and critique of the results. The 
communication of the full cognitive context is also an important precondition for better 
cooperation between different kinds of science. The unitary view of science leads to a 
common framework of science that shows the methodological differences between 
different kinds of research in terms of the degree of reduction of the research world and 
the degree of involvement. The framework distinguishes between the empirical and 
normative aspects of science, but there is no fundamental difference between, for 
instance, natural and social sciences. The different kinds of research have the same 
potential for doing good science, and this view of science can therefore serve as a basis 
for promoting transdisciplinary systemic research. 
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